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Abstract
Title: Self-Reported Malingering: Prevalence, Strategies, and Decision
Making
Author: Bethany Linn Hall Wellman, M.S.
Committee Chair: Vida Tyc, Ph.D
Objective: Malingering is intentional fabrication or exaggeration of
physical or mental symptoms for the purpose of gaining an external
incentive, whether it be for a reward or a gain of some sort or avoidance of
an unwanted outcome (Gorman, 1982). Understanding malingering
behaviors for accurate identification is of vital importance due to both the
economic burden on health care corporations, workers compensation and
disability services when malingering goes unidentified, as well as the harm
caused to individuals with genuine symptoms falsely suspected of
malingering. Greater understanding of malingering practices to help
improve resources for correct identification is an area within psychological
research of continued need. To date, little research has identified strategies
individuals utilize to malinger an illness. This study sought to answer how
individuals choose what symptoms to malinger. What we know of the
prevalence of malingering has been derived from research examining
simulated malingering and evaluator identified malingering. This research
sought to investigate the prevalence of malingering among adults in
ordinary situations based on self-report. Additionally, given the high
occurrence of malingering in forensic settings, this study investigated
iii

individuals’ response to being placed in a high stakes criminal situation on
whether participants would attempt to malinger, the impairments they
would feign, and perceptions of symptoms most likely to alleviate criminal
responsibility.
Results: A total of 246 adult participants were enrolled on this study. All
participants were required to complete an online survey that asked about
malingering behaviors. Results from this study showed a 50% rate of selfreported malingering. Although no differences in malingering were noted
in regard to age, race, and occupation, women self-reported historical
malingering more (89%) and at a higher rate than men (average of 12
times); additionally, of those who, endorsed hypothetically malingering in a
high stakes criminal scenario 71% were women. Medical and physical
impairments were the most commonly feigned symptoms as was the
secondary gain of avoiding work or occupational responsibilities. When
asked to select reasons for past utilized symptoms, participants chose
symptoms they were able to demonstrate with ease most commonly,
followed by symptoms that fits the situation/scenario. In a hypothetical
criminal scenario, only 8.5% of participants reported they would fake an
illness in order to alleviate guilt, most commonly choosing to feign brain
and psychological impairments by utilizing their knowledge of symptoms to
convince others of their lack of guilt. Lastly, participants believed that brain
injury or neurocognitive difficulties would be most effective in alleviating
guilt in a criminal case, followed by a major mental health disorder severe
iv

enough to require hospitalization. This collective information will aid
psychologists in better understanding the motivation for malingering and
the strategic decision making that goes into feigning illnesses in order to
more reliably differentiate malingering versus legitimate psychopathology.
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Introduction
Malingering is defined as the purposeful invention of fake or greatly
exaggerated medical or psychological symptomology, inspired by the
receiving of an incentive, such as financial compensation, drugs, or
avoiding negative consequences such as work, criminal responsibility, and
military duty (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Malingering is
volitional and goal-oriented and involves the formation of fabricated
symptoms or the exaggeration of pre-existing symptoms for personal gain
(Iverson, 1994). The major distinction between psychiatric symptomology
and malingered symptoms, aside from the legitimacy of symptomology, is
the intentional deception for external gains (Saberi et al., 2013).
Malingering mental illness, by definition, is facilitated by an
external form of secondary gain that is typically thought to function in five
different realms. The first is in regards to criminals seeking to avoid
retribution or punishment. Often those involved in the criminal justice
system may be motivated to feign (i.e. fake) mental illness by presenting as
incompetent to stand trial, incompetent to be executed, insane at the time of
the crime, or deserving of mitigation during sentencing (Paradis, Solomon,
Owen, & Brooker, 2013). This feigning may be purposeful in
circumventing punishment altogether or specific to avoiding jail or prison
and instead seeking admittance into psychiatric hospitals for perceived
“easier” time served. Second, malingering may occur to seek monetary
compensation for psychological injury or disability from social security,
1

veteran’s benefits, or worker’s compensation (Young et al., 2016). Third,
those who malinger may do so to avoid enrollment into the military or
unwanted military missions, as well in avoiding combative experiences.
Fourth, malingerers may seek treatment or admission to psychiatric
hospitals to obtain shelter and services as well as the potential to avoid
arrest. Fifth, people may malinger for the potential to obtain commonly
desired and abused drugs, particularly opiates, barbiturates,
benzodiazepines and stimulants (McDermott & Feldman, 2007). Types of
symptoms commonly feigned are psychosis, memory impairment, physical
injury, trauma symptoms, and mood impairment (Saberi et al., 2013).
The significance and impact of undiagnosed malingering is
extensive. Given the number of motivations individuals may have to
malinger, it is important to consider the impact malingering has on the
society, state, and federal fiscal stability, as well as the health care system
(Conroy & Kwartner, 2006). Malingering delays and congests the court
system as well as impedes services for those truly ill patients in need of
care. Time, effort, and finances spent treating and caring for those
malingering becomes draining to the workforce and legal and medical
systems as a whole (Chafetz & Underhill, 2013).
Due to the impact of malingering on the welfare of society,
psychological research and clinical practice efforts to detect malingering
have expanded throughout the years. In particular, attention has been
focused on the reliability and validity of standardized measures that
2

differentiate true malingering versus psychopathology (Tan, Slick, Strauss,
& Hultsch, 2002). Indicators commonly addressed in malingering
assessments are indiscriminate endorsing of symptomology, rare symptom
endorsement, and blatant symptoms that may replicate severe impairment
(Larrabee, 2012). Assessment measures allow professionals to identify
improbable symptoms, behavioral inconsistencies, and other red flags for
malingering. However, to arrive at a sound decision of symptom distortion,
it is beneficial to consider strategies people utilize to malinger, how these
decisions occur, and whether knowledge and/or experience has been
impactful. Williams (1998) proposed certain approaches and behaviors that
those malingering may adopt, such as responding inaccurately, presenting
as distractible, and responding slowly or chaotically. However, other
strategies may be utilized such as refusing to respond, out of fear of being
incorrect, going above and beyond necessary symptoms to prove severity,
as well as adopting “textbook” symptomology that may have been
researched to convince the professional of the legitimacy of one’s
complaints.
To date, psychological research on malingering has identified
prevalence rates, areas of increased motivation (criminal, military, medical,
etc.), the societal harm of malingering, as well as the gold standard
psychological assessments for evaluating malingering. Very little research
has identified strategies individuals utilize to feign or exaggerate mental
illness. However, one study by Iverson (1995) attempted to identify test3

taking strategies from self-report measures. Participants included
undergraduate students, community volunteers, psychiatric inpatients, and
federal inmates. Results showed a limited number of strategies endorsed
across the groups with only 14% of the participants overall, endorsing a
specific method of planning, such as evidencing behaviors common in
head-injuries, or researching common aspects of memory impairments.
Malingering strategies endorsed by participants included reduced
cooperation, displaying aggravation and frustration, slow responding and
repeated hesitations, and overall confusion throughout the testing process.
The most commonly used approach (16% of participants) was to feign total
amnesia. However, this study instructed participants to fake memory
impairments and participants may have utilized other strategies if these
instructions were not provided.
Considering the individuals who malinger, mental health
professionals must determine what are the characteristics of a person who
malingers and what distinguishes them from those who would not malinger.
Why would some malinger and others not? What motivations and thought
processes lead towards malingering? When faced with life changing
outcomes, such as receiving large sums of money or the forfeiture of
privilege and freedom, how would an individual proceed to convince others
of the legitimacy of their feigned symptoms? This study sought to
investigate the prevalence of malingering based on self-report, to identify
the self-reported strategies for feigning impairments and factors that impact
4

a decision to malinger, and to determine the reason behind the choice of
symptom to feign. It is hypothesized that participants’ experience with the
symptoms reported will justify their symptom choice. Additionally, given
the high prevalence of malingering in forensic settings, this study also
investigated whether individuals would attempt to malinger when placed in
a high stakes criminal situation, the symptoms they would attempt to feign,
and their perceptions of symptoms most likely to alleviate criminal
responsibility. Unlike prior studies that included hospitalized or
incarcerated populations (Iverson, 1995), this study includes an adult
community sample. Given the confidential nature of this study and the
manner in which questions are posed, it is assumed that individuals will
shed light on their general decision making strategies without fear of being
exposed for their past malingering behaviors. This collective information
will aid psychologists in better understanding the motivation for
malingering as well as the strategic decision making that goes into feigning
illness and assist in reliably differentiating malingering versus legitimate
psychopathology.
Literature Review
Definition and History of Malingering
Feigning mental illness has been recognized since ancient eras. In
biblical times, there were accounts of malingering when King David
feigned madness when he became fearful of Achish, King of Gath
(McQueen, 1994). In Greek literature, Ulysses feigned insanity to evade
5

fighting in the Trojan War (Guerber, 1893). Even Shakespeare’s
compositions contain interpretations of feigned illness: Hamlet, when he
was attempting to escape the machinations of his uncle; and Edgar in King
Lear, who feigned madness in order to escape the persecutions of his
brother (Chesterman, Terback, & Vaughan, 2008).
Multiple definitions of malingering exist reaching back from its
initial conceptualization, to its contemporary understanding through which
it is now identified. The word “malinger” resonates from the late eighteenth
century French phrase “malingerer” which means “to suffer” or “pretend to
be ill” (Malinger, n.d.). Paolo Zacchias, the father of forensic medicine,
suggested that there is “no disease more easily feigned, or difficult to
detect” than insanity (Gavin, 1843). Within the history of forensic
psychology, the case of James Hadfield provided a piece of the foundation
for the insanity defense as Hadfield developed psychosis after sustaining a
head injury, and later attempted to assassinate King George III (Moran,
1985). Hadfield was charged with high treason, however, was found not
guilty by reason of insanity. This case led to a change in court proceedings
which allowed for the confinement of the criminally insane.
Conversely, the community began to develop concerns regarding the
potential for feigning mental illness, since there were no available resources
nor assessments to identify true insanity. In order to close the gap in
assessing for true versus feigned mental illness, multiple nineteenth century
Psychiatrists developed guidelines to identify feigned insanity. Psychiatrist,
6

George Hill advocated for utilizing behavioral observations, noting the
presence or absence of usual features of insanity, as well as examining the
likelihood of exaggeration in presentation of mental health symptoms
(Torrey & Miller, 1937). Ray (1838) and Taylor (1865) suggested the best
identification strategy for malingering is to observe individuals for an
extensive period of time, and to seek evidence of malingering outside of an
individual’s symptoms and reported difficulties. Bucknill and Tuke (1858),
suggested that in many cases, feigned mental illness is best identified when
behavior is acted in “outrageousness and absurdity of conduct.” They
reported that in attempt to make symptoms seem legitimate, individuals
faking insanity often present with symptoms from several different
conditions, versus consistency within a specific disorder. Lastly, Bucknill
and Tuke (1858) indicated that individuals malingering cognitive deficits
often take a dramatic approach that may include professing illiteracy, faking
major deficits such as an inability to “count to ten correctly or tell the day of
the week, or how many children they have” as well as answering the
majority of basic questions incorrectly, which could be accurately
responded by mentally ill individuals.
Taylor (1865) illustrated the tendency of malingering individuals to
draw attention to their illness, utilizing symptoms such as feigned
psychosis, and presenting a sudden and inconsistent clinical presentation,
with evidence of overacting and an absence of mental illness prior to the
offense or current timeframe. Ray (1838) suggested utilizing undisclosed
7

observations in distinguishing malingering. This was based on the belief
that malingerers tend to have difficulty maintaining the sick role at all
times, and have moments of forgetfulness or a false sense of security in
their surroundings when they put aside their false behavior and assume their
realistic behavior and stability. According to Ossipov (1944), a malingerer’s
depiction of psychotic symptoms would be based on their understanding
and perception of psychosis, that would pull from their previous experience
or exposure to mental illness to inform their presentation. Additionally,
Ossipov (1944) noted that malingerers tend to frequently overact the part,
by over-emphasizing their fictional symptoms in an attempt to better
convince the skeptical clinician.
As more understanding of malingering became available, so too did
the need for those malingering to be identified, as political acts and the
changing society allowed for increased rates of malingering to occur. For
example, the Compensation Act of 1906 introduced financial and social
benefit to the community, also increasing the potential for malingering
illness to be financially compensated. Collie (1917) noted that clients would
often develop their ideas of insanity or psychological injury from
melodramas, with a desperation to draw attention to their illness while
confirming their madness. He further concluded that client’s noted
delusions would be quite inconsistent and the physical symptoms related to
depression would be poorly faked (Collie, 1917). The First World War
developed a spike in cases of malingering due to efforts to avoid both
8

deployment and avoid front line battles. Therefore, the detection of
malingering became part of the war effort. Jones and Llewellyn (1917)
emphasized how malingered mental illness was most often found in
individuals with previous experience with mental illness or those who had
“hysterical or psychopathic personality traits.” At that time, empirical
methods, such as comparing a client’s clinical presentation to a typical
presentation of mental illness, supported by the literature, were first utilized
to identify malingering (Jones & Llewellyn, 1917). Additionally, tendencies
towards exaggeration, incongruent affect, suggestion of additional
symptoms, and attempts, to bring attention to their difficulties, also assisted
scientists in identifying malingering individuals (Chesterman, et al., 2008;
Jones & Llewellyn, 1917). When identifying psychosis, false hallucinations
were often presented as visual representations and false delusions were
illogical and inconsistent compared to true delusions, with clients not
responding with anger if contradicted as one would see with true delusions
(Chesterman, et al., 2008).
From its inception, it is evident that forensic scientists considered
the detection of malingered mental illness to be of central importance. By
the mid 19th century, attaining an in- depth history and engaging in an
extended period of observation when the client was unaware they were
being observed, were well documented and highly valued strategies in
assessment of potentially faked psychological symptoms. Forensic
psychiatrists suggested that a swift arrival of symptoms, over expression of
9

symptoms, attention seeking, lack of impairments in appetite or sleep, no
change to affect, lack of eye contact, reluctance to answer questions, a lack
of the typical fluctuation of symptom severity, and failure to exhibit a
typical tactless approach, viewed in many with true mental illness, were
identified as indicators of malingering mental illness (Gavin, 1843; Guy,
1845; Ray,1838). Furthermore, many experts in the forensic field identified
severe memory impairment as typical in faking insanity (Gavin, 1843; Guy,
1845; Ray, 1838). As such, Psychiatrists began developing many diverse
interventions to uncover malingering including the suggestion of new
symptoms, repeating questions to sense inconsistencies, inspecting the
clients’ writing for flow of thought, and threats and use of physical
interventions as punishment (Chesterman, Terback & Vaughan, 2008).
Differential Diagnosis
In addition to an evolving conceptualization of malingering over
time, the act of malingering has also been variably defined across
professional associations. For mental health professionals who operate
under the DSM-V, malingering encompasses the “intentional production of
false or grossly exaggerated physical or psychological symptoms” that
develop from “motivation by external incentives” (American Psychiatric
Association, 2013). Historically, the American Psychological Association’s
(APA) definition of malingering has not referenced exaggeration, instead
identifying it as the purposeful feigning of an illness or disability that is
inspired to accomplish a particular specific outcome (Young, 2014).
10

Similarly, historical legal definitions of malingering included feigning for
external incentives, such as disability benefits, but did not include an
exaggeration component (Young, 2014). The court operates under the
expectation that mental health professionals should use the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Illness, (DSM-V) as the basis for diagnosis.
However, the DSM’s criteria for malingering has been criticized and
alternative approaches are often used in psychological evaluations to
determine the presence of malingering (Berry & Nelson, 2010). After much
criticism of incongruent definitions, both the APA and legal definitions now
include the exaggeration component of malingering for the purpose of
universal identification and interdisciplinary understanding (American
Psychiatric Association, 2013).
A formal condition of malingering using the DSM-V requires that
the symptoms be both “false and grossly exaggerated” as well as have an
externally motivated incentive (American Psychiatric Association, 2013).
Additionally, the DSM-V outlines four areas, that if present, should indicate
suspicion of malingering and suggest further assessment of symptomology
and presentation. Malingering should be considered if: a) the individual is
involved in litigation, referred by a lawyer, or has recent criminal charges in
process; b) if there is a distinct inconsistency in the individual’s observed
behavior and reported distress, symptomology or disability; c) there is a
lack of cooperation during evaluation or noncompliance with treatment
guidelines; and d) there is the presence of a diagnosis or indications of
11

antisocial personality disorder (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). In
the assessment of malingering, both the client’s volition and the presence of
external motivation must be examined. The DSM has consistently failed to
provide additional and specific criteria for malingering that would guide
clinicians, as it does not recognize malingering as a psychiatric diagnosis,
but rather as a “condition that may be a focus of clinical attention”
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013).
When considering whether a person is malingering, it should be
noted that malingering and mental illness are not mutually exclusive
occurrences nor an “all-or-nothing phenomenon,” as it operates on many
different levels (Conroy & Kwartner, 2006). Mental health professionals
must recognize that psychological disorders may be genuinely experienced
by the patient at the same time that malingering is also occurring. The
individual may amplify authentic symptoms in order to generate the
presence of severe psychopathology. A patient may have symptoms of
depression, yet exaggerate those symptoms in order to accomplish
secondary gain. As the DSM-V definition notes, malingering is either an
intentional production of symptoms or the exaggeration of symptoms;
therefore, some of the most effective malingers are those who have
experienced the actual symptoms they are feigning (American Psychiatric
Association, 2013). Alternatively, the individual may lengthen their
legitimate symptoms to a past period of criminal activity for the purpose of
reducing their current accountability. Finally, there are persons who
12

manufacture symptoms entirely, solely for the purpose of obtaining an
external incentive.
Exaggeration and malingering are theoretically interrelated,
however, they are not synonymous. Malingering cannot technically occur
without a form of exaggeration, yet exaggeration can occur without being
considered malingering. The term exaggeration is a commonly used term
found existing well outside the psychological framework, yet malingering is
rather uncommon. Exaggeration is commonly identified in those presenting
with a need for sympathy or attention and may be commonly identified in
those with personality disorders, depression, chronic pain, somatic
disorders, fibromyalgia, and factitious disorder (Iverson, 2007). Within
many of these disorders or difficulties, symptoms are self-reported and not
visually identifiable to health care providers. As such, patients may
exaggerate symptoms in frequency, severity, intensity, and duration, in
order to be taken seriously or to avoid being dismissed and/or have their
concerns be minimized by their health care provider. Furthermore, when
exaggerating symptoms, the incentive does not need to be external, but can
be supported and upheld by internal incentives. For example, a patient may
be reinforced for their ability to gain attention and/or being substantially
cared for by a professional when they exaggerate their symptoms.
The term feigning is often used interchangeably with malingering,
however, the two concepts are different. According to the American
Heritage dictionary, feigning is defined as “to represent falsely; to imitate
13

so as to deceive” (Feigning, 2011) whereas malingering means “to feign
illness or other incapacity in order to avoid duty or work” (Malingering,
2011). Aside from the act of deception, there is no other intrinsic incentive
contained in the definition of feigning. Throughout this review, we utilize
the term feigning when specific secondary gain is not identified, and only
deception, or the faking of an impairment is noted. Heilbronner et al. (2009)
and McCullumsmith and Ford (2011) examined the difference between
malingering and feigning in terms of the distinction between detection and
diagnosis. A clinician may be able to detect a symptom being falsely
produced, however, in order to diagnose malingering, the external incentive,
or secondary gain for that fabrication must be illuminated.
There are only two disorders in the Diagnostic and Statistical
manual that involve the conscious production of symptoms: Factitious
Disorder and Malingering. The DSM-V identifies Factitious Disorder as
characterized by physical or psychological symptoms that are intentionally
produced or feigned in order to assume the sick role (American Psychiatric
Association, 2013). Malingering encompasses exaggerated symptoms for
the purpose of external gain (American Psychiatric Association, 2013).
External incentives can vary greatly, dependent on the context, whether
developed to gain an incentive, such as financial incentives, or to avoid an
undesired outcome, such as incarceration or punishment. While both
disorders involve the intentional production of symptoms, either physical or
psychological, the definitions imply that the clinician must be able to
14

distinguish between a primary gain (being a patient and the intrinsic benefit
that provides) versus secondary gain or external incentive (Scott &
McDermott, 2013). Factitious Disorder is classified as a mental illness,
whereas Malingering is classified as a v-code, otherwise known as another
condition that is of importance and clinical attention.
Reason for Malingering/Explanatory Models
Several theories have been proposed to explain the potential
motivations for malingering. Rogers, Sewell, and Goldstein (1994) provided
empirical support for the classification of the motivation of malingering into
three distinct models: a) ‘pathogenic’ (i.e. the underlying motivation is a
mental disorder or some form of psychopathology); b) ‘criminological’ (i.e.,
people with a history of antisocial personality disorder who are susceptible
to malingering when faced with a forensic evaluation); and c) ‘adaptational’
(i.e., a cost–benefit analysis).
The theory that has garnered the most acceptance is the adaptational
model, proposed by Rogers (2008), given its ability to provide an
explanation for malingering under a wide variety of contexts. In this model,
the malingerer is confronted with an adverse situation (e.g. being arrested)
and determines that under these circumstances malingering mental illness is
the only method of avoiding conviction (in the above-noted situation).
However, this explanatory model only provides an explanation for the
behavior; it does not describe the specific incentives that motivate the
behaviors, symptom choice, and decisions surrounding the malingered
15

symptoms. Malingering may be a selected tactic when situational stressors
are permeated with the individual’s own investment. Therefore, the risk of
losing that investment may lead to a decision to malinger in an adversarial
position. Rogers (2008) titled this model the decision of “comparison
predicted utility” as part of “decision theory” which names three situations
that increase the prevalence of malingering; an oppositional position,
extraordinary risk or reward, or lack of other options (Rogers, 1990).
This adaptational model operates with the understanding that
humans are often placed in adverse situations and forced to make difficult
choices. However, when malingering comes into play, clinicians can assess
the client’s decision making style, their perception surrounding their life
barriers, and their objectivity in attempting to meet their own needs (Rogers
et al., 1994). Young, Jacobson, Einzig, Gray and Gudjonsson (2016)
examined potential malingering among civil plaintiffs referred for
neuropsychological evaluations. Their aim was to assess whether a specific
personality style was related with malingering. However, no significant
association was found between malingering of a cognitive impairment and
personality traits. These findings supported the adaptational model ideology
that malingering was more situation specific and unrelated to personality
characteristic. Individuals tend to perform a cost–benefit evaluation and
subsequently choose to make no effort or deliberately attempt poor
performance. Within the adaptational model, individuals are believed to
malinger, irrespective of their innate goodness or badness, as a means of
16

self-protection that allows deception of perceived enemies as an appropriate
response.
Other models proposed by Rogers and colleagues are less accepted
when considering true malingering motives. The pathogenic model operates
under the belief that malingering develops from an unidentified and/or
undiagnosed psychopathology, in an attempt to mask or regulate true
deficits (Rogers, 2008; Rogers, Gillis, Dickens, & Bagby, 1991; Rogers et
al., 1994). Jungian ideas suggest individuals have a natural fear against
being institutionalized; therefore, feigning symptoms for the purpose of
institutionalization would indicate a psychological deficiency or abnormal
behavior, regardless of a desire to avoid other aversive situations such as
prison and punishment. As a method to manage malingered symptoms and
to maintain a façade, cognitive dissention results as deceptive tendencies
create a conflict between a positive view of one’s self against negative
behaviors, such as deceiving others when valuing one’s self as an honest
individual (Richer, 2014). For the malingering individual to manage this
dissonance, he or she adopts their falsehoods as truth.
Historical definitions of malingering, as identified in the Diagnostic
and Statistical manuals, have been based on the criminological model of
malingering with the focus being on antisocial personality factors in the
context of lawful matters (Rogers, 2008). Specifically, there is a long
identified pattern of antisocial offenders feigning psychological impairment
(i.e. insanity) to escape penalties. The pathogenic and criminological
17

models suggest that much of the motivation to malinger is due to
personality characteristics and the desire to avoid having impairments
identified, or obtaining an external incentive. However, studies have
consistently found insufficient correlational evidence between antisocial
personality features and malingering (Chesterman et al., 2008; Poythress,
Edens & Watkins, 2001; Rogers et al., 1994; Young et al., 2016). For
example, Young et al., (2016) studied a sample of 63 civil litigants seeking
neuropsychological assessment of traumatic brain injury (TBI) to identify
the relationship between malingering and personality traits. Researchers
used the Test of Memory Malingering (TOMM) to identify memory
malingering, Raven’s Standard Progressive Matrices (RSPM) as a test of
nonverbal intelligence to identify malingering and the Eysenck Personality
questionnaire-R short scale (EPQ-RS) to measure personality traits of
psychoticism (measuring antisocial personality traits), extraversion
(measuring sociability), neuroticism (measuring emotional lability) and
lying (measuring social desirability). They found no effects of personality
characteristics on malingering behaviors; no significant differences in
personality factors were found between those who malingered versus those
who did not (Young et al., 2016). These findings suggest that malingering is
situation specific and influenced mostly by adaptation factors (i.e. costbenefit analysis), rather than criminal motivations or antisocial personality
characteristics as suggested within the pathogenic and criminological
models of malingering.
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Significance of Identifying Malingering
Malingering is not a victimless crime. Undiagnosed malingering is
extensive with grave impact to societal and personal expenses as well to the
fiscal stability of the health care system. In 2016, the percentage of working
age American people receiving Social Security Disability Income was 19.2
percent which translates to approximately 3.9 million disabled people out of
the workforce. The overall rate of disability for all ages was approximately
12.8 percent in 2016, which has steadily since increasing from 11.9 percent
in 2010 (Erickson, Lee, & Schrader, 2018; Kraus, 2017). Based on a Wall
Street data analysis of the Social Security Administration’s budget, the
United States pays 11.4 billion dollars per month for social security
disability, increasing from 6.1 billion per month just one decade prior
(Peters, 2016). As the security and funding of the Social Security
Administration is already in question, the billions of dollars spent to fund
those without true disability adversely impacts others in true need of
support as well as the future generations that may go without SSI if funding
is no longer available (Seward & Connor, 2008).
Within the medical domain, feigned and fraudulent medical
expenses cost approximately $150 billion annually, increasing the cost of
U.S. insurance by $1800 per family according to the Texas Department of
Insurance (Suspected Insurance Fraud Report, 2006). Overall health care
expenditure in the U.S. is a colossal $2.7 trillion dollars. In 2012, Donald
Berwick, a former head of the Centres for Medicare and Medicaid Services
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(CMS), and Andrew Hackbarth of the RAND (Research and Development)
Corporation, estimated that fraud costs approximately $98 billion, or
roughly 10% of annual Medicare and Medicaid spending alone, and up to
approximately $272 billion across the entire health system (Berwick &
Hackbarth, 2012). A large proportion of these fraudulent charges stem from
those feigning illnesses. The increasing cost to insurance companies
translates to increased insurance premiums for American households. Due
to the impact of deception, numerous insurance companies utilize special
groups specifically tasked to manage fraudulent claims (Pankratz, 1998).
Insurance claim adjusters refer suspicious claims to these task forces who
investigate these potentially fraudulent claims to decrease insurance rates
overall. Identification of suspicious claims as well as identifying those who
are feigning illnesses are essential in management and protecting the health
care system, taxpayers dollars, and society.
Malingering also increases the taxpayer costs for legal proceedings,
healthcare and medications, and a variety of other expenses. It is quite
difficult for individuals with genuine mental illnesses to receive appropriate
treatment and funding assistance when necessary funds are being allocated
to those who do not need them. In addition, in many parts of the country
there are a limited number of psychiatric inpatient beds available
(Lutterman, Shaw, Fisher, & Manderscheid, 2017). For those with severe
mental illness waiting to receive treatment, it is not uncommon to spend
days in emergency care facilities on waitlists for admittance to mental
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health facilities. Malingering creates societal penalties by delaying and
congesting the court system, as well as increased time taken from
professionals who deal with these concerns. The finances and efforts taking
part in caring for those malingering is draining to those in the healthcare
workforce, and medical resources as a whole (Chafetz & Underhill, 2013).
Overall, there are costs accompanying successful malingering. As
identified, false insurance claims that are undetected led to increased
insurance payments and diversion of funding from those in medical need to
the undeserving (Bordini, Chaknis Ekman-Turner, & Perna, 2002). When
those malingering are not accurately recognized, the administration of
justice is obstructed. Charges might be dismissed and malingerers will
achieve their secondary gain by avoiding prison for treatment-based
rehabilitation (Frederick, Crosby, & Wynkoop, 2000). In general, as health
insurance companies have adopted methods to identify false claims, so too
does the mental health system rely on mental health professionals to
identify and extract those who attempt to misuse the funding, housing,
efforts and benefits achieved through feigning mental illness. Without
methods to accurately identify those malingering individuals, the negative
outcomes to both health care availability and increased costs to society will
continue to grow. The role of forensic psychologists is to identify true
versus feigned impairment in relationship to the legal system in particular,
however all clinicians have a role in identifying those feigning their mental
illnesses. Psychological symptoms appear to be more easily faked as there
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are no objective manifestations of the disease. Subjective
psychological assertions such as suicidal attempts, anxiety, and depression
(etc.) are difficult to confirm.
Prevalence of Malingering: Demographics
Across studies on malingering behavior, demographic factors have
been examined with variable results. Examination of gender effects on
malingering has gained very little empirical attention as more males are
included in studies due to a stronger presence in correctional and forensic
settings, where research participants are often recruited (Heard, 2010).
However, research suggests a gender difference in malingering in that
prevalence rates of malingering in the general population are approximately
3% of males and 1% of females (Raine, 2009). Gneezy (2005) suggested
that women are more likely to fake positive feelings, and therefore one
might assume that women might be less likely to malinger based on these
findings. In a study comparing the malingering behaviors between forensic
and non-forensic cases, significant gender differences were found in nonforensic cases but not in regard to forensic situations, when there were
significantly fewer female participants (Rogers et al., 1998). A higher
percentage of females feigned medical ailments (50% versus males 25%)
but a lower percentage feigned cognitive impairments than did males (6%
female versus 23% male), (Rogers et al., 1998). Overall, research by Dreber
and Johannesson (2008) suggested that men were more prone to lie for
monetary gain. The current study identified demographic differences on
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self-reported malingering behaviors in both past behaviors but also when
faced with a criminal scenario pertinent to understanding malingering in
forensic contexts.
Younger age has also been found to be a common factor within
those malingering illnesses. In a study of 4500 military personnel, those
malingering were identified as young personnel, aged 20 or younger
(“Malingering and Factitious Disorders,” 2013). Similarly, in a study of 75
inmates complaining of psychological impairment, those who were
identified as malingering were significantly younger than non-malingerers.
The researchers of this study postulated that the younger inmates resorted to
malingering due to less sophisticated decision-making skills, and impulsive
behavior with a willingness to use risky strategies than more mature
inmates; they may also be less adept at feigning mental illness due to less
experience and knowledge. This study looks at the role of age in selfreported malingering behaviors.
No significant differences in prevalence of malingering have been
identified based on an individual’s race. One study by DuAlba and Scott
(1993) examined malingering differences in Hispanic and Caucasian
participants. Overall, they found that Hispanic participants were no more
likely to malinger than Caucasians. However, Hispanic individuals were
more likely to somaticize emotional symptoms as physical impairments
which suggested that Hispanic individuals may be more likely to malinger
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physical impairments versus mental illness. This study examines selfreported malingering behaviors and approach to malingering based on race.
Prevalence of Malingering Across Settings
The rates of malingering have been challenging to pinpoint and may
vary across studies based on timeframe, the research methods utilized to
calculate them, and the setting. Research has focused on those settings in
which malingering would be most profitable and incentivized: prison,
pretrial and criminal prosecutions, the military, disability services, as well
as medical and mental health settings. Dependent on the setting, the
secondary gain will vary based on the individual’s needs or desires at that
time. Those who fake symptoms are unlikely to report their faking
behaviors, as it would be contraindicated for progress towards reaching
their incentive. Therefore, rates are often based on the diagnosis and
detection of malingering by professionals or prospective rates of
malingering based on simulated malingering research. Overall, it has been
estimated that 1% of the general population of patients with mental illness
malinger their symptoms (Benjamin & Virginia, 2007).
Malingering estimates have been most commonly provided for
forensic populations and broadly range from 3.5% to 66% due to variable
sample sizes, reason for referral (i.e. type of evaluation or reason for
individual being seen by a treatment provider), and type of setting (outpatient vs. in-patient) (Cochrane, Grisso, & Frederick, 2001; Cornell &
Hawk, 1989; Frederick, 2000; Heinze & Purisch, 2001; McDermott &
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Sokolov, 2009; Norris & May, 1998; Rogers, 1986; Rogers, Sewell, &
Goldstein, 1994; Vitacco, Rogers, Gabel, & Munizza, 2007; Wasyliw,
Grossman, Haywood, & Cavanaugh, 1988; Weinborn, Orr, Woods,
Conover, & Feiz, 2003). When considering rates of forensic malingering,
criminal forensic and civil cases that pertain to the law are distinguished.
Criminal forensic malingering refers to those feigning mental illness to be
alleviated of criminal responsibility, specifically incompetence to stand trial
and not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI), as well as malingering
illnesses while incarcerated for avoidance of the setting and punishments
involved with incarceration (Feuerstein et al., 2005). Civil malingering
refers to malingering of an illness to obtain compensation or services for
secondary gain and include forensic evaluations of workers compensation,
personal injury and disability services (Feuerstein et al., 2005). Average
rates were reported by Rogers, Sewell, and Goldsteing (1994), who found
that malingering occurred in approximately 16% of forensic patients and
around 7% in non-forensic patients.
Regarding malingering in forensic evaluations for criminal
responsibility, Rogers, Seman, and Clark (1986) found that approximately
21% of all criminal defendants evaluated for criminal responsibility were
identified or suspected of malingering. In an earlier study that included
pretrial defendants evaluated for sanity at the time of the crime, 3.5%
showed strong evidence of malingering and an additional 17% displayed
some aspects of deception in their presentation (Rogers, 1986). Specific to
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competency to stand trial evaluations, estimates for malingering appear to
range from 8% to 18% (Cornell & Hawk, 1989; Rogers, Salekin, Sewell,
Goldstein, & Leonard, 1998). McDermott, Rabin, Scott, and Warburton
(2009) estimated that 18% of patients found incompetent to proceed with
their trial malingered symptoms of mental illness when admitted to an
inpatient facility for restoration to competency.
The rates of malingering among inmates in correctional facilities are
generally high, with rates upwards of 66% (McDermott & Sokolov, 2009),
based on motivation to seek safer or more ideal housing, search for
medication, or desire transfer to a different, hospital based, facility, likely
an identifiable improvement over a prison cell. Thus, the secondary gain of
inmates as a whole is likely to differ from inmates being evaluated for
competency or NGRI (not guilty by reason of insanity). McDermott, Dualan
and Scott (2013) found the rate of jail inmates seeking mental health
services to be substantially higher (64.5%) than those completing pretrial
evaluations (17.5%), suggesting that inmates were likely to feign mental
illness with the hopes to be relocated to a different unit or facility for
treatment. In an earlier study of malingering in correctional settings,
Pollock and colleagues (1997) examined 60 referrals from prison to a
medium secure unit, using the psychological assessments of the Structured
Interview of Reported Symptoms (SIRS) and Minnesota Multiphasic
Personality Inventory (MMPI-2) validity measures, and found that 32% of
the sample was malingering or exaggerating their psychological symptoms.
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Interestingly, in a similar study consisting of 75 inmates from minimum and
maximum security jail systems with complaints of psychiatric symptoms,
forensic psychologists utilized the Structured Interview of Reported
Symptoms (SIRS) to identify a higher range of malingering between 4556% (Norris & May, 1998). In a more recent study by McDermott and
Sokolov (2009), 66% of jail inmates receiving psychological services were
suspected of malingering. However, in this study, only inmates suspected of
malingering were evaluated via psychological assessment, which may
account for the higher rates.
In medical civil procedures, estimates of malingering are typically
greater than in criminal legal circumstances, with financial incentives likely
accounting for this difference. When considering Rogers' adaptational
model of malingering (Rogers, 1990) in the civil context, the higher the
financial incentives (i.e. the personal stakes or reward is high), the greater
the likelihood of malingering (Lebourgeois, 2007). A variety of malingering
symptom presentations are likely to develop within the civil proceedings of
disability and workers compensation and include head injury, chronic pain,
memory impairment/cognitive deficits, and PTSD. In general, within civil
procedures, disability claims are undoubtedly an area with high rates of
malingering. Overall, Griffin, Normington, May, and Glassmire (1996)
suggested that nearly one in five social security disability claimants
malingered their symptoms.
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A complaint commonly associated with civil cases are those
claiming memory and cognitive deficits that impair their ability to function.
The rates of those who malinger cognitive and memory difficulties on
neuropsychological evaluations have been quite variable, ranging from 1388% (Boone et al., 1995; Larrabee, 2007; Mittenberg, et al., 2002; Sullivan,
Lange, & Dawes, 2007). For head injury cases, Larrabee (2000) suggested
that the exaggeration of deficits in those claiming mild head injury was
approximately ten times greater than those with true deficits. In a review of
eleven studies on malingering, Larrabee (2003) suggested a prevalence rate
of 40% in approximately 1400 patients who were seeking compensation for
a mild head injury. In a comparable study focusing on patients with head
injury, Binder and Rohling (1996), found that individuals with less severe
injuries who sought compensation displayed more extreme abnormalities
and disabilities than those with more severe head injuries. On the higher
end, a study of patients involved in litigation due to accidents resulting in
whiplash and evaluated for neurological difficulties in an outpatient clinic, a
malingering rate of 61% was estimated, compared to 29% of those
receiving an outpatient neuropsychological evaluation for other reasons
(Schmand et al., 1998). Chronic pain is also commonly malingered for
disability services, financial assistance, and avoidance of employment.
Greve, Ord, Bianchini, and Curtis (2009), examined over 500 patients
reporting chronic pain who were seeking financial compensation.
Researchers identified a malingering rate between 20% and 50%, which is
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generally consistent with figures reported in other studies on the feigning of
pain (Kay, Morris-Jones, 1998; Leavitt & Sweet, 1986; Mittenberg et al.,
2002).
Another area of commonly identified malingering is within military
and veteran services. Military and veterans settings experience malingering
at higher rates as well for secondary gain of avoiding military duty or to
gain disability financial benefits secondary to military service. In a 19982012 surveillance of military service members, the rates of malingering and
factitious illness increased from 15 per 10,000 persons in 1998 to 50 in the
year 2000, and then down to nine persons in 2007 (“Malingering and
Factitious Disorders,” 2013). Lande and Williams (2013) examined over 26
million military medical visits between 2001–2011 and discovered
approximately 1,000 diagnoses of malingering. Many of these individuals
are commonly diagnosed with Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and
are often motivated by financial incentives. Frueh, Hamner, Cahill, Gold,
and Hamlin (2000) completed a study of veterans seeking financial
compensation for a PTSD- related disability and found that approximately
30% of veterans feigned their symptoms. As with other forms of
malingering, the extent to which individuals feign PTSD remains largely
unknown with estimates from 2% to up towards 50% (Lees-Haley 1997;
Rogers 2008; Singh et al. 2007; Smith & Frueh, 1996). The rates of
malingered PTSD appear to be quite dependent upon the context of their
claim and the setting in which these symptoms are presented.
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Lastly, malingering also occurs in both medical and mental health
treatment settings. Yates, Nordquist, and Schultz-Ross (1996) suggested
approximately 13% of patients visiting the emergency room malingered
their illness with the most suspected secondary gains for malingering in
general included “food, shelter, medications, financial gains, and avoidance
of jail, work, or family responsibilities.” In mental health settings,
malingering rates have been estimated to be around 10% to 12% among
psychiatric inpatients (Rissmiller, Steer, Friedman, & DeMercurio, 1999).
Malingered Symptom Choice
Malingered Psychological Symptoms. As the rates of malingering
mental illness vary based on the setting, situation, and referral type so too
does the variation of symptoms or impairments commonly identified across
these areas. Relatively little research has been conducted to determine
symptoms that are most commonly malingered. Cognitive impairment has
been identified commonly across both forensic and non-forensic settings.
Williams (1998) discussed multiple tactics individuals may utilize to
attempt to malinger by faking mental illness with cognitive impairments,
such as incorrect responding, distractibility, slow processing speed, and
disorganization in thoughts. Furthermore, Williams (1998) found that
memory impairment is a common complaint in relationship to traumatic
brain injury, and should be suspected as a type of cognitive ability most
prone to be malingered. Rogers and colleagues (1998) compared the
malingered symptoms (mental disorders, cognitive impairments and clinical
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syndromes) in both forensic and non-forensic cases. The non-forensic cases
mostly imitated mental disorders, but forensic cases frequently simulated
medical problems and cognitive impairment symptoms. However, this
statement has been revised based on more recent findings (Feuerstein et al.,
2005) suggesting that in forensic settings, mental illness is more commonly
malingered to avoid prison sentencing and instead receive treatment via
state psychiatric facilities, whereas physical impairment is more often
malingered in relationship to financial claims for disability benefits or
workers compensation claims.
Although cognitive impairment is a consistently utilized symptom in
malingering, so too is the feigning of psychosis and presentation of
abnormal behavior. A study by Cornell and Hawk (1989) looked at the rates
of malingered psychosis as prevalent in pretrial evaluation of offenders,
assessing for criminal responsibility or competency to stand trial. Findings
indicated that approximately 8% of the 314 evaluated offenders feigned
psychotic symptoms. When compared to those with true psychotic
symptoms, those who feigned psychosis had lower levels of education, had
a longer history of criminal charges, and committed more severe crimes (i.e.
crimes against person versus a property crime), suggesting greater
motivation to malinger. An interesting finding of this study was
approximately half of those diagnosed as malingering had a history of
psychiatric hospitalization, which may have provided them the experience
needed to attempt to imitate psychosis. Lastly, those with malingered
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psychosis were found to portray the typically recognized features of
psychosis, such as hallucinations, and were less likely to exhibit
inappropriate affect, poor personal hygiene, and impairment in the content
of flow of thoughts. Cornell and Hawk (1989) found similar evidence in
their sample of criminal defendants referred for pretrial psychological
evaluation, as the most prominently feigned symptoms were auditory
hallucinations and “overemphasized behavior.” Saberi and colleagues
(2013) analyzed prominent symptoms malingered within the Iranian
population, specifically among defendants being evaluated for criminal
responsibility and mental status. Out of 45 evaluated defendants, the most
common malingered symptoms were behavioral (unusual dress, motor
behavior, bizarre behavior, altered level of consciousness; 78%), mood and
affect (69%), and cognitive function (memory and orientation; 60%). In this
study, participants with a history of imprisonment, illicit drug abuse, major
mental, neurological or psychiatric problems were excluded as authors
wanted to identify only “a relatively pure sample of participants without
psychotic symptoms” and avoid the possibility that the symptoms of mental
illness were learned from others. This reduced the likelihood of including
malingerers who relied on past experience in choosing their symptom to
feign and instead used bizarre behavior in their attempt to simulate
psychological impairment.
Across the relevant literature, rates of depressive and affective
disorders are not as prominently identified in relationship to malingering in
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forensic evaluations as these disorders don’t alter functionality and
orientation to the point that symptoms will alleviate criminal responsibility.
It is more common to see mood impairment in relationship to financial
compensation and disability services, and potentially in correctional
facilities. However, level of impairment and symptoms related to mood and
affective disorders are more difficult to measure. According to a study by
Lees-Haley and Dunn (1994), 97% of college freshmen asked to endorse
symptoms for major depression were able to correctly identify enough
symptoms to support the diagnosis. Therefore, depression, as a clinical
disorder, is easily conceptualized by the general public and easily feigned
by those attempting to malinger. This is similarly true for traumatic
disorders as research has supported that malingered trauma symptoms tend
to be comparable to the reports from genuine trauma patients (Elhai et al.,
2005; Lees-Haley, 1990). In one study, students who simulated malingering
were not able to be differentiated from patients who reported real trauma
symptoms (McGuire, 2002). However other studies have identified
malingered trauma symptoms to be of an exaggerated quality (Efendov,
Sellbom, & Bagby, 2008; Elhai et al. 2001; Porter, Peace, & Emmett,
2007), as those feigning trauma often inflate their symptoms across both
psychological and physiological clinical scales of assessment without
detection (Gray, Elhai, & Briere, 2010; Merckelbach, Smeets, & Jelicic,
2009). Additionally, multiple studies have identified that validity scales
within psychological and malingering assessments are not effective in
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discriminating the authenticity of trauma symptoms (Edens, Otto, & Dwyer,
1998; Koch, Douglas, Nicholls, & O’Neill, 2006; Peace, Porter, & Cook,
2010).
Malingered Medical Symptoms. As with psychological symptoms,
estimates of malingered symptoms in the medical setting vary considerably
as well. Mittenberg and colleagues (2002) examined approximately 30,000
cases referred to 140 neuropsychologists and found the most likely
impairment malingered was mild head injury, followed by fibromyalgia or
chronic fatigue syndrome, pain, neurotoxic disorders, electrical injury,
seizure disorders, and moderate or severe head injury. According to
Hamilton and Feldman (2001), general practitioners are more likely to see
malingerers who commonly present with “cervical pain and repetitive strain
injuries.” The symptoms malingered will likely align with the settings and
the providers’ specialties, as neuropsychologists are likely to evaluate head
trauma, and general practitioners are more likely to focus on pain
complaints. In orthopedic settings, surgeons and neurosurgeons from six
different states were surveyed about the prevalence of individuals feigning
back pain and rates varied widely from 1-75%. The majority of the surgeons
reported lower estimates of malingering with 78% of providers reporting
10% or less of their patients to be feigning their pain experiences. In most
cases, surgeons were able to identify malingering based on inconsistencies
in medical examinations, such as greater disability presented than indicated
by objective presentation, as well as inconsistencies in weakness across
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settings, with little consideration to the potential of secondary gain. Other
studies suggest that the occurrence of malingered pain is significantly
higher with malingering estimates at approximately 30% for cases of
fibromyalgia (Gervais & Russell, 2001) and similar results found for
patients malingering chronic pain (Gervais, Green & Allen, 2001).
The highest rates of malingered medical impairments have been
documented in the realm of personal injury litigation, workers
compensation, and disability claims (Greiffenstein & Baker, 2006;
Mittenberg et al., 2002). Additionally, research has found that those
presenting with milder injuries or lesser symptoms were more likely to seek
compensation or disability services (Alexander, 1992; Millis, 1992). In a
review of over 11 studies and 1,400 patients seeking benefits for a mild
head injury, Larrabee (2003) identified malingering in 40% of cases. Rogers
and colleagues (1993) estimated that 50% of individuals seeking personal
injury financial compensation feigned all or part of reported cognitive
impairments. Furthermore, Binder and colleagues (1996) examined the
impact of financial compensation on the production of neuropsychological
symptoms and concluded that compensation is a critical piece in the
motivated development of malingered impairments. Similar to the
malingering of mental illness, malingering rates are generally higher for
symptoms and impairments unlikely to be objectively identified by medical
tests and based more so on the patient’s subjective report of its type,
severity and extent (Hamilton & Feldman, 2001; Mittenberg et al., 2002).
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Attribution of Malingered Impairment
Research is limited regarding why an individual chooses a particular
illness, symptom, or impairment to feign. Factors that may influence these
decisions are one’s personal experience, ease in feigning a symptom, and
whether the symptom meets qualifications needed to meet the type of
desired secondary gain (Hall & Poirier, 2001; Iverson, 1994; Kleinman &
Stewart, 2004).
Personal Experience. It is reasonable to assume that judgment and
decision making are heavily influenced by familiarity. People tend to think
first of things they know or are familiar with, versus thinking outside the
box, as an initial approach. Therefore, accounting for how people make
decisions for themselves may be similar to how they recall information
from memory. The manner in which people intake, process, and recall
information best is known as the serial-position effect and is composed of
the primacy and recency effect (Murdock, 1962). The primacy effect
suggests that information is recalled best when it is presented first. In
learning information, the primacy effect states that we remember best what
we learn or experience earliest (Murdock, 1962). Priming is unconscious
within our memories and activates associations in our memories prior to
carrying out a task or action (McLeod, 2008). In the context of malingering,
it may be that individuals choose the symptoms or impairments with which
they are most familiar with, or primed with earliest and longest within their
life. The primacy effect occurs because individuals have time to rehearse
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early presented information until the experience/information or behavior is
stored in their memory at capacity (McLeod, 2008). On the other hand, the
recency effect is a principle that suggests that the information or
experiences presented most recently will likely be remembered and recalled
best. The recency effect occurs as the most recent information utilized is
still stored in short term memory without decay and is the freshest
information in a person’s mind. The recency effect is also related to a term
within memory and decision making research called the availability
heuristic, which suggests that information that is more “available” in one’s
cognitive processing (i.e., things that have been thought or experienced
most recently) is most prone to influence a person perception, thoughts and
behaviors (Murdock, 1962). Therefore, malingering based on the recency
effect suggests that individuals will feign symptoms they have experienced
most recently. In general, learning theories suggest that people store
information in long term memory best when the information is applied to
the primacy and/or recency effect. It should also be considered that
information or experiences stored in the deepest levels of one’s memory
will be the most familiar and strongly associated with their life (Craik &
Lockhart, 1972). The levels of processing model suggests that the deeper
information is processed, the longer a memory will last and the easier the
information is to recall (Craik & Lockhart, 1972). Lastly, the spreading
activation model is related to semantic memory (knowledge accumulated
throughout a life) in that concepts become linked together and form strong
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connections; the neurons associated with these connections are more likely
to be excited and activated again, bringing the information into our
awareness (Collins & Loftus, 1975). Research by Collins and Loftus (1975)
proposes that these connections are not based on logic but are based on
personal experiences.
Types of malingering can be differentiated by the degree to which
symptoms are expressed. Partial malingering utilizes exaggeration of
symptoms from a previously acquired illness that continue to persist for the
individual. A study by Kleinman and Stewart (2004) suggested that partial
malingering was the most common type of malingering, with pure
malingering (fabricating all symptoms expressed) being much less common.
Furthermore, Kleinman and Stewart (2004) found that patients who pursued
treatment following a traumatic event seemed to most likely utilize either
intentional or conscious exaggeration of genuine problems (i.e. partial
malingering) versus fabricating of entirely nonexistent difficulties. Wooley
and Rogers (2014) tested the different proposed models of malingering by
examining whether people who malingered were able to fake symptoms of
PTSD without being diagnosed as malingering. The results suggested that
those in the partial malingering group were the most successful malingerers.
It may be that individuals who have personal experience with symptoms can
more accurately describe their symptoms and therefore, are more successful
in fooling those trained to identify deception.
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Ease in Feigning. It is common for individuals to feign medical
symptoms that are hard to legitimize, such as nerve pain or stomach
difficulties, as these cannot always been measured nor identified on an
medical test. As such, people may choose symptoms to fake based on the
simplicity to fake and get away with their deception, with little chance of
professionals proving their symptoms to be false. Little research has been
conducted to identify strategies for malingering based on ease of feigning
symptoms. Iverson (1994) attempted to identify symptom choice and
strategies for malingering in neurocognitive settings and found that the most
common neuropsychological symptom feigned by participants was general
amnesia. Participants indicated being unsure of the manner in which to
make their memory impairment appear believable and found it an easier
strategy to pretend to appear totally deprived of their memories in general.
Fitting the Part. Those who malinger do so for secondary gain as
their goal. According to Hall and Poirier (2001), those who feign some form
of impairment tend to decide their feigned symptomology in terms of the
factors that best satisfy their goals. For example, a defendant may feign
cognitive impairment, memory loss, and confusion symptoms for the
purpose of establishing a diagnosable head injury to be used as evidence in
a personal injury claim or disability claim. Using another example, a
defendant on trial for a crime in which evidence is thoroughly stacked
against him/her, may try to alleviate their guilt by presenting with severe
psychosis to convince others that they had no awareness or control over
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their actions. If a defendant were to choose to pretend to have chronic pain
or a mild head injury, these symptoms would likely not be as influential in
supporting their goal of alleviating guilt. The goal of the clinician in these
cases would be to identify inconsistencies in an individual’s behavioral and
symptom presentation, evaluate the validity of symptoms, and question the
individual to identify aspects surrounding these cases (i.e. financial
opportunity, avoidance of criminal responsibility etc.) that can be acting as
motivation or secondary gain.
Study Rationale and Justification
Empirical research on malingering has focused on prevalence,
symptoms feigned, and the development of comprehensive detection
assessments to assist professionals in identifying deceptive symptoms and
behavior. Examination of prevalence rates is largely based on the number of
malingerers identified by a psychological evaluation or a medical provider’s
observation of inconsistencies in patient report and behavior. However,
rates of malingering are likely to be much higher if one considers the
number of malingerers who go undetected. Although a number of measures
have been designed to detect malingering, there is no fool proof method to
accurately assess individuals who fabricate their symptoms. Despite the
numerous models and motives identified to explain malingering behavior,
the consensus of forensic experts to date is that there is no empirical method
to identify who will choose to malinger and what symptom or disorder they
will choose to feign.
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Little is known about the characteristics of malingerers decision
making strategies. Research has identified a “partial pattern of malingering”
to be a common form of malingering with an individual exaggerating
symptoms pre-existing illness for external gain (Kleinman & Stewart,
2004). However, partial malingering and false imputation (attributing
symptoms to an alternate cause) are often the most difficult to detect due to
the individual’s experience with genuine symptoms, allowing them to report
and fake symptoms accurately and avoid detection (Hall & Hall, 2006). For
example, individuals who have true schizophrenia may feign additional or
more exaggerated symptoms to escape criminal responsibility, seek an
increase in disability compensation, or obtain hospital admission when
homeless (Resnick, 1997). Identifying malingering in these situations is
difficult to accurately assess as clinicians are not as likely to be suspicious
of malingering due to the patient’s history of treatment as well as the likely
presence of residual schizophrenic symptoms (Rogers, Sewell, & Goldstein,
1994). What makes partial malingerers most successful is how they are able
to utilize their experience with psychosis (or other symptoms), and their
observations of other individuals with psychosis, from time spent in
treatment. Additionally, it is likely partial malingerers can anticipate
questions to expect and can learn to adapt their story and presentation to fit
criteria for a diagnosis and potentially even the insanity defense.
Additionally, few studies have considered the basis behind what
symptoms are most commonly faked and why those symptoms are chosen.
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At this point, only one study has attempted to identify actual strategies
individuals utilize to feign their symptoms. Iverson (1995) examined selfreported strategies among participants who were given the instruction to
feign memory impairment. Few participants reported a decisive method,
such as behaving similarly to those with head injuries or seeking out
information on memory impairment. For those who reported strategies, they
suggested they would demonstrate lack of cooperation, show aggravation or
frustration at questions asked, respond slowly, or act generally confused
(Iverson, 1995). While this study asked participants to feign memory
impairments, it is possible that participants may apply other strategies or
symptom choices without this instruction provided. Research has yet to ask
participants to self-report their malingering behaviors throughout their life,
missing the opportunity to establish a more so accurate rate of malingering.
If given the opportunity to self-report previous occasions of malingering,
without cause for concern of being caught or threat of harm, participants
should be more likely disclose true experiences. Furthermore, if posed with
hypothetical scenarios and questions of “what would you do in this
situation,” participants should feel little risk in responding honestly.
The what and when, of malingering have been thoroughly analyzed
in the research literature, however, the how has been somewhat overlooked.
One of the whys of malingering is based on the secondary gain received, yet
how and why do malingerers choose the symptoms they feign? Do
individuals make their symptom choices based on what they know or
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experience, what symptom or disorder is perceived to be the easiest to fake
and deliver, or what they find to be most believable to the situation?
Clinicians are trained to identify discrepancies between an individual’s
presentation and known characteristics of mental illness. However, mental
illness and some aspects of physical ailments are the easiest impairments to
fake, yet the most difficult to detect (Chesterman et al., 2008). Identification
of how and why individuals choose the symptoms to be feigned is critical in
helping clinicians and evaluators to recognize the underpinnings of decision
making in those who attempt to deceive. Understanding why a person
makes the choices they are making, and the factors that influence that
choice, are important identifying symptom profiles for more in depth and
accurate assessment. Expanding detection methods to account for this new
information on the how and why of malingering symptoms is of vast
importance to prepare evaluators to identify deception in those best
prepared to deceive.
This study will contribute to the growing literature by specifically
obtaining self-reported information from community participants regarding
their malingering behaviors in ordinary life situations. Unlike prior studies,
our examination of generalized self-reported malingering and the strategies
utilized to develop the feigned symptom is unique. Specifically, this study
will evaluate why individuals make the choice to malinger, based on their
own self report, and the factors that influence this choice, their selection of
symptom(s), and the strategies they use to effectively malinger these
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symptoms. The current proposal seeks to address the gaps in the literature to
better prepare clinicians and evaluators to identify malingering from the
perspective and practices of individuals for which faking impairment
becomes an option.
Objectives and Hypotheses
1. To determine the proportion of adults who report malingering in
ordinary daily life situations.
a. The proportion of adults who report engaging in malingering
during their adult life will be 75% or greater. Furthermore, it is
expected that participants will report, on average, a malingering
frequency of five times throughout their adult life.
2. To compare those who report malingering versus those who deny
malingering based on, but not limited to, age, gender, and race.
a. No significant gender differences will be found for past
malingering experiences or malingering in a high stakes criminal
situation.
b. Younger participants (age 18-35) will endorse higher rates of
malingering experiences and be more likely to endorse
malingering in a high stakes criminal situation.
c. No significant racial differences will be found for past
malingering experiences or malingering in a high stakes criminal
situation.
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3. To determine the most common secondary gain associated with adults
engaging in malingering.
a. The most common secondary gain endorsed by participants will
be faking symptoms in order to avoid a work or an occupational
obligation.
4. To determine symptoms or impairments that were most commonly
malingered and the reasons for that symptom choice.
a. Symptoms most commonly malingered by participants will be
medical and physical impairments. It is hypothesized that
participants’ experience with the symptoms reported will justify
their symptom choice.
5. To identify the outcomes in malingering symptoms in a hypothetical
scenario that involves facing a high penalty criminal charge. Outcomes
include: the rate of people who would attempt to malinger, the symptom
believed most likely to avoid criminal responsibility, the symptom most
commonly chosen to malinger, and reasons for symptom choice.
a. It is hypothesized that a low proportion (<20%) of participants
will report an attempt to malinger when facing a high penalty
crime.
b. Neurocognitive impairment, such as memory loss, will be the
most commonly malingered symptom reported.
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c. Participants will make their symptom choice based on a
symptom they have experienced or observed more often or most
recently.
d. Participants will report a major mental health problem as most
effective in avoiding responsibility for a high stakes crime.
Methodology
Study Design
This cross-sectional study examined adult self-reported rates and
experiences with malingering, both in real world actual practices and in a
hypothetical, high stakes, criminal case. Additionally, types of symptoms
malingered and the reasons for symptom choice were explored.
Participants and Eligibility for Study Inclusion. Eligible
participants for this study included English speaking adults, age 18 years
and older. Participants included a convenience sample of community
participants. Participants were recruited via a range of methods to include
announcements on internet blogs and websites, and booths set up at a local
outdoor shopping mall encouraging participation. The final sample
consisted of 246 participants who completed the survey; 16.7% identified as
male (n=41) and 83.3% identified as female (n=205). The average age of
participants was 39.34 years of those who reported their age, ranging from
20 to 79 years (n=245, SD = 14.54). The predominant race of participants
was White/Caucasian at 89.4% (n=220) followed by Hispanic at 3.7%
(n=9), Black/African American at 2.0% (n=5), Biracial at 2.0% (n=5),
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Asian/Asian-American at .8% (n=2), American Indian or Alaskan Native at
.8% (n=2), and other at 1.2% (n=3). The most common occupations were
education, medical healthcare, and full-time student (see Table 1 for full list
of reported occupations). In terms of number of times arrested, 90.2%
indicated never having been arrested (n=222), 7.3% indicated being arrested
one time (n=18), 1.6% indicated being arrested two times (n=4), .4%
indicated being arrested three times (n=1) and .4% indicated being arrested
four times (n=1). The average number of times arrested considering all
participants, was less than one arrest (M=.13, SD=.47).
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Table 1
Adult Employment Occupation
Occupation Category

Frequency

Percent

Medical Healthcare

30

12.2%

Education

30

12.2%

Full-Time Student

30

12.2%

Mental Healthcare

28

11.4%

Business, HR, and
Finance
Clerical, Secretarial, and
Numerical Clerk
Legal and Social Welfare

28

11.4%

23

9.3%

11

4.5%

Retail, Catering, Waiting
and Bar Staff
Unemployed, Disabled,
Stay at home parent
Engineering & Building

11

4.5%

11

4.5%

8

3.3%

Information Technology

7

2.8%

Marketing, PR and Sales

7

2.8%

Pastor/Clergy

6

2.4%

Arts, Design and Media

5

2.0%

Childcare, Health and
Education
Other/Not Specified

5

2.0%

3

1.2%

Science Professional

2

.8%

Cosmetology, Personal
Service
Total

1

.4%

246
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100.0

Procedures. All participants were asked to complete an online
survey that asked about their previous malingering behaviors as well as
responding to questions given a high stakes criminal scenario. The survey
was developed for purposes of this study and were accessible through
Qualtrics. Qualtrics is an online data collection and analysis software that
allows researchers to build, distribute and analyze participant responses.
Approval by the Institutional Review Board at the Florida Institute of
Technology was obtained prior to participant enrollment. Informed consent
was obtained prior to beginning the survey. Participants were informed that
participation in the study was to provide information about the decision
making processes behind faking illnesses. Participant information was
entered into a HIPAA-compliant database and all personal identifying
information was de-identified with minimal risk of breaching
confidentiality. Participants who completed the survey had the opportunity
for their name to be entered into a drawing for a $50 gift card.
Malingering Survey. Participants completed a survey responding to
experiences that pertain to malingering for secondary gain. The survey
consisted of 18 items within three sections; demographics, malingering
experience, and a hypothetical scenario. For numerical responses where
ranges or text were given, they were replaced with a number in the exact
median of the range or text replaced with a numeral (e.g. “none” replaced
with 0, “4 to 5” replaced with 4.5).
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Demographics. Participants responded to four multiple choice and
numerical response questions to obtain demographic variables of as age,
race and occupation. Participants were asked a series of three questions to
provide information about their arrest history, their contact with law
enforcement and legal information, mental and physical health history, and
family history of mental illness.
Malingering experience. Participants were asked a series of six
questions in multiple choice or open-ended numerical response format
regarding their malingering experiences. Information regarding whether or
not they have faked an impairment or symptom for secondary gain as well
as the approximate number of times this has occurred in their lifetime was
obtained. Participants were asked to identify the purpose or secondary gain
associated with their faked symptom(s) (i.e. what they were avoiding or
hoping to gain) including their most commonly utilized reason and all
reasons that motivated them to feign their symptom(s). Participants were
then asked to disclose the types of symptoms faked in their lifetime (such as
medical or physical disability, memory impairment etc.) and the reasons for
their choice of faked impairment.
Hypothetical Scenario. Participants were provided a hypothetical
scenario followed by a series of five questions, in both multiple choice and
open-ended response format, in which they were asked to identify
themselves as the main character of the story and to respond to questions
pertaining to the story as if they were placed in that situation with the same
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potential outcomes. The scenario simulated a high penalty crime for which
the individual participant was guilty of and facing the penalty of long-term
incarceration. This scenario was adapted from prior plea bargain research in
which participants were presented with a vignette and required to choose
whether to take a plea or continue to proceed to trial (Beasley, n.d.).
Participants responded to scenario-based questions inquiring whether they
would fake a symptom to be excused of guilt. Participants were then told
that no other defense is available to them and they must identify a symptom
to be alleviated of guilt; therefore, they identified one symptom they would
choose to fake and the category (e.g., physical/medical difficulty, memory
impairment, mental health problem etc.) in which that symptom would best
fit. Participants also identified the reasons for their symptom choice as well
as the type of symptom that would be most successful in alleviating a
person of guilt in a criminal case.
Outcome Variables
Demographics. This study considered the demographic outcomes of
age, gender (male/female), race, and occupation. Additionally, the number
of times a person has been arrested was examined to identify whether those
with greater knowledge and experience with law enforcement choose
impairments associated with alleviated guilt in criminological cases.
Experience with impairments commonly identified in malingering situations
(e.g., disability cases, incompetent to stand trial, not guilty by reason of
insanity, etc.) was measured to identify if those with experience with
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specific symptoms choose to endorse symptoms experienced personally
when choosing a malingered symptom option. Measures of frequency and
central tendency were utilized to identify outcomes of demographic
variables.
Rates of Malingering. The proportion of participants who endorsed
malingering versus deny malingering in the study sample was calculated
based on their responses to a survey item that assesses whether they ever
faked any mental or medical impairment for secondary gain during their
adult life (scored as yes/no). The number of times participants malingered
in their adult life was also recorded.
Secondary Gain Motivation. Participants endorsed the types of
secondary gain motivations that have driven them to fake a symptom in
their lifetime, as well as the most frequently utilized secondary gain
motivation. Secondary gain responses include: to avoid work or an
occupational obligation, avoid an appointment (doctors, dentist, therapist
etc.), avoid personal obligations (caring for child, spouse, home, property
etc.), avoid negative consequences or outcomes, avoid a social commitment
or activities (club meetings, fundraisers, etc.), or to incur monetary gains
(attempts to gain donations, government funding, insurance aid etc.). The
total number of secondary gain motivations endorsed by participants was
calculated and the most commonly used secondary gain motivation was
identified.
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Malingering Symptoms. Participants indicated the types of
symptoms they have faked in their adult life. Symptom category responses
include: medical or physical disability, head/brain injury, cognitive
impairment (low IQ/lack of understanding), memory impairment (limited or
no memory) or psychological impairment/distress. The total number of
symptoms endorsed was calculated and the most commonly endorsed
symptoms was identified.
Reasons for Symptom Choice. Participants indicated the reasons
for their symptom choice that include the following responses: recent
personal experience with that symptoms/disorder, long/cumulative personal
history of experience with that symptom disorder, recent exposure to others
with that symptoms/disorder (i.e., witness someone else have that difficulty
recently), long/cumulative exposure to others with that symptom/disorder
(i.e., witness someone else have that difficulty for many years or in many
cases), knowledge of symptom/difficulty, easy to fake, easy to hide (e.g., no
one can really see if I have a stomach ache or not- they could see if I had a
cast on though) and severity of symptom justifies the excuse (i.e. if I am
vomiting no one would expect me to be able to come to work). The total
number of reasons endorsed was calculated and the most commonly
endorsed reasons were identified.
Hypothetical Scenario.
Choice to Malinger. Malingering behaviors in a high stakes
situation was examined by asking participants to choose whether to fake a
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symptom to alleviate guilt for crime or to honestly endorse guilt and accept
the consequences. Response options were based on a dichotomous: yes/no
response.
Forced Symptom Choice. Participants were forced to choose one
symptom as if they had no other choice but to malinger. Symptom choice
was determined by asking participants to fill in the blank with their own
response and qualitatively analyzed. Symptom choice was also classified by
asking participants to select items grouped in nominal categories: major
physical or medical difficulties, brain injury or neurocognitive difficulties
(e.g. Epilepsy, Alzheimer’s, Traumatic Brain Injury), intellectual disability
(low IQ/lack of understanding), memory impairment (limited or no
memory), developmental and/or learning disability (experienced as an adult
only) (e.g., autism, ADHD), and major mental health problems that could
result in hospitalization due to severity (e.g. Schizophrenia, Major
Depressive Disorder, PTSD etc.).
Reasons for symptom choice. Participants were asked about their
reasoning behind their symptom choice in the high stakes scenario through
a nominal categorical variable selection. Reasons for their symptom choice
included the following response options: recent personal experience with
that symptoms/disorder, long/cumulative personal history of experience
with that symptom disorder, recent exposure to others with that
symptoms/disorder (i.e., witness someone else have that difficulty recently),
long/cumulative exposure to others with that symptom/disorder (i.e.,
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witness someone else have that difficulty for many years or in many cases),
knowledge of symptom/difficulty, easy to fake, easy to hide (e.g., no one
can really see if I have a stomach ache or not- they could see if I had a cast
on though) and severity of symptom justifies the excuse (i.e. if I am
vomiting no one would expect me to be able to come to work). The total
number of reasons endorsed was calculated and the most commonly
endorsed reasons were identified relative to the scenario.
Effective Symptoms. Participants were asked to select the symptom
category that they believe to be most effective in alleviating a person of
guilt in a criminal situation. Symptoms included; major physical or medical
difficulties, brain injury or neurocognitive difficulties (e.g. Epilepsy,
Alzheimer’s, Traumatic Brain Injury), intellectual disability (low IQ/lack of
understanding), memory impairment (limited or no memory),
developmental and/or learning disability (experienced as an adult only)
(e.g., autism, ADHD) and major mental health problem that could result in
hospitalization due to severity (e.g. Schizophrenia, Major Depressive
Disorder, PTSD etc.). This was utilized to identify participants’ awareness
of impairments commonly utilized/identified in criminal cases that alleviate
a person’s guilt for a crime or find a person incompetent to proceed through
their court hearing. Participants choose the one symptom category they find
to be most effective in alleviating guilt. Frequency and percentiles denoted
the most common symptom selections to identify participant perceptions.
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Analysis
This study utilized a cross-sectional design and data was collected
via a one-time online survey. To the extent possible, the results were
descriptively compared to findings from prior research. Descriptive
analyses including frequency distributions, percentiles, means, and standard
deviations were provided for demographics, malingering experiences of
prevalence rates, secondary gain motivation, types of symptoms malingered
and reasons for symptom choice, hypothetical scenario choice to malinger,
type of symptom choice, reason for symptom choice, and most effective
symptom in alleviating guilt. Chi-square tests were utilized to examine the
association between demographic variables (age, gender, race) and
categorical malingering outcome variables. Pearson correlations were
utilized to determine the relationship between number of times participants
malingered and age as well as number of arrests. Analysis of variance
(ANOVA) was utilized to compare malingered behavior between subsets of
the sample based on race and occupation. T-tests were utilized to compare
demographic outcomes between those who endorsed versus denied
malingering. As this was an exploratory study, all p values were set at
p<.05. All analyses were performed with SPSS version 25.
Results
Who Self-Reports Malingering
Of the 246 participants, there was a relatively equal distribution of
participants who endorsed (49.6%, n=122) or denied (50.4%, n=124) faking
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a mental or medical impairment for the purpose of secondary gain at least
once. The 122 participants who endorsed faking an impairment for
secondary gain did so an average of eleven times (M=11.24, SD=20.53l;
range 0-137) (see Figure 1 for rates of malingering).

Figure 1. Rates of Self-Reported Malingering

More women reported a history of malingering than men in a chisquare goodness of fit test χ2 (1, N = 246) = 6.30, p =.01 (see Figure 2 and
Table 2). There were no significant differences in the average age of those
who reported malingering (age M=39.44, SD =14.03), and those who did
not report malingering (age M=39.24, SD =15.09; t(241) =.11, p=0.219).
Racial disparities between those who denied versus endorsed malingering
are displayed in Table 2. Of the 24 participants who reported a history of
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arrests, half reported a history of malingering (n=12) and half reported no
history of malingering (n=12), identical to the distribution among the nonarrested participants. Of those who endorsed malingering, number of arrests
ranged from 0 to 3 with the average number of arrests at less than 1 (M=.14,
SD=.47). Of those who denied malingering, number of arrests ranged from
0 to 4 with the average number of arrests less than 1 (M=.13, SD=.48).

Figure 2. Gender Differences in Self-Reported Malingering.
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Table 2
Demographic Comparisons Between Those Who Endorsed a History of
Malingering and Those Who Denied a History of Malingering.
Malingerers NonChi
t-test
(n=122)
Malingerers Square
(n=124)
Gender
Male 10.7%
22.6%
χ2 (1, N
(n=13)
(n=28)
= 246)
Female 89.3%
77.4%
= 6.30,
(n=109)
(n=96)
p =.01
Race
Caucasian 88.5%
90.3%
(n=108)
(n=112)
Hispanic 4.1% (n= 5) 3.2% (n= 4)
African American 2.5% (n=3)
1.6% (n=2)
Biracial/Multiracial 2.5% (n=3)
1.6% (n=2)
American Indian or .8% (n=1)
.8% (n=1)
Alaskan native
Asian .8% (n=1)
.8% (n=1)
Other Race .8% (n=1)
1.6% (n=2)
Age
M=39.44,
M=39.24,
t(241)
SD =14.03
SD =15.09
=.11,
p=0.219
How Do People Malinger
Number of times malingered. Males who endorsed malingering
(n=13) malingered an average of five times (M=4.77, SD=4.38) whereas
females (n=109) indicated they malingered an average of 12 times in their
adult life (M=12.01, SD=21.56); however, this gender difference was not
significantly different (t(120) =-1.20, p=0.231). A one-way analysis of
variance (ANOVA) showed no significant difference in the number of times
malingering occurred in one’s adult life between racial, (F(6,115)=1.93,
p=0.082) or occupational groups, (F(14,107)=.70, p=.766). A Pearson
Correlation indicated no significant relationship between a participant’s age
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and the number of times they reported malingering (r(120)=-0.39, p=.67).
However, there was a significant relationship between the number of times
a participant was arrested and the number of times they reported
malingering (r(120)=.192, p=.03). Of those who endorsed malingering, the
average number of arrests was less than one among the 12 who had been
arrested (M=.14, SD=.47) (see Figure 3).

Figure 3. Relationship Between the Number of Arrests and Number of
Times Malingered.

Secondary gain. Of those participants who reported malingering in
their adult life (n=122), avoiding work or occupational obligation was the
most frequently endorsed option (f=92, 75.4%) followed by avoidance of a
social commitment (f=90, 73.8%). Other reasons are indicated in Table 3.
Second, participants were asked to then endorse the one secondary gain
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they were motivated by most often. Of those who reported a history of
malingering, the secondary gain of avoiding work or occupation obligation
was endorsed most often (f=52, 42.6%), followed by avoiding a social
commitment or activity (f=46, 37.7%) (see Table 4). Other reasons endorsed
were to obtain drugs, to get medical attention, to gain time to socialize or
relax, to avoid judgment from others, or to avoid school (see Table 4).

Table 3
Most Frequently Endorsed Secondary Gain.
Secondary Gain

Frequency

Avoid work/occupational
obligation
Avoid social commitment or
activity

Percent

92

75.4%

90

73.8%

Avoid personal obligations

24

19.7%

Avoid an appointment

22

18.0%

Avoid negative
consequences or outcomes

19

15.6%

Other (written in)

12

9.8%

1

.8%

Gain monetary benefit

Note: Participants (N=246) were asked to select all options that had
motivated them to feign an illness; therefore, the percentage column
designates the percentage of participants who endorsed that selection
and does not add up to 100%.
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Table 4
Most Commonly Endorsed Secondary Gain.
Secondary Gain

Frequency

Percent

Avoid work/occupational
obligation

52

42.6%

Avoid social commitment or
activity

46

37.7%

Avoid negative
consequences or outcomes

8

6.6%

Other

7

5.7%

Avoid an appointment

5

4.1%

Avoid personal obligations

4

3.3 %

Gain monetary benefit

0

0%

122

100%

Total

Note: Participants (N=246) were asked to select one option that had
motivated them most to feign an illness; therefore, the percent column
designates the percentage of participants who endorsed that selection.

Symptoms malingered. Participants were asked to endorse all
symptoms that they have faked in order to avoid an obligation or gain a
benefit. Of those who reported malingering in their adult life, faking a
medical or physical disability was the most frequently endorsed (f=111,
91%). Other symptoms are listed in Table 5.
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Table 5
Most Frequently Endorsed Malingered Symptom
Symptom

Frequency

Medical or physical
disability

Percent

111

91.0%

14

11.5%

Memory impairment

4

3.3%

Cognitive impairment

1

.8%

Brain injury

1

.8%

Psychological impairment

Note. Participants (N=246) were asked to select all symptoms they
feigned such that participants could endorse more than one
symptom/response; therefore, the percent column designates the
percentage of participants who endorsed that selection and does not add
up to 100%.

Motivation and symptom selection. In general, participants most
commonly feigned a medical/physical symptom or disability for the all
secondary gain categories including: 71.3% of those who chose secondary
gain of avoiding work, 17.2% (n=21) of those avoiding an appointment,
18% (n=22) of participants avoiding personal obligations, 11.5% (n=14) of
participants avoiding negative consequences, and 70.5% (n=86) of
participants avoiding social commitments or activities (see Table 6 for
complete results).
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Table 6
Frequencies and Percentage of Malingered Symptom Chosen for Each
Secondary Gain Category.
Avoid
Work

Avoid
Apt.

Medical

71.3%
(f=87)

17.2%
(f=21)

Mental
Health

9.0%
(f=11)

Memory

Avoid
Pers.
Oblig.

Avoid
Negative
Conseq.

Avoid
Social
Commit.

Gain
Money

18.0%
(f=22)

11.5%
(f=14)

70.5%
(f=86)

0%
(f=0)

1.6%
(f=2)

3.3%
(f=4)

5.7%
(f=7)

6.6%
(f=8)

.8%
(f=1)

2.5%
(f=3)

1.6%
(f=2)

.8%
(f=1)

1.6%
(f=2)

2.5%
(f=3)

0%
(f=0)

Cognitive

.8%
(f=1)

.8%
(f=1)

.8%
(f=1)

0%
(f=0)

.8%
(f=1)

0%
(f=0)

Brain
Injury

.8%
(f=1)

0%
(f=0)

.8%
(f=1)

0%
(f=0)

.8%
(f=1)

0%
(f=0)

Note: Percentages endorsed above are indicative of the percentage of the
sample (N=246) that endorsed that combination of secondary gain and
symptom choice. This denotes the symptoms commonly displayed
depending on the participant’s motivation.
Symptom Selection. Participants were asked to select all the
reasons for their previous symptom selection. Participants utilized
symptoms that felt they were able to demonstrate with ease most
commonly, followed by symptoms that aligned best with the situation. Of
those who malingered, symptoms that were easy to hide (f =68, 55.7%)
were most commonly selected, followed by symptoms that were easy to
fake (f =66, 54.1%)(see Table 7). Other reasons for symptom selection are
indicated in Table 7.
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Table 7
Reason for Symptom Choice
Reason

Frequency

Percent

Easy to hide

68

55.7%

Easy to fake

66

54.1%

Severity of symptom justifies
excuse

48

39.3%

Recent personal experience
with a symptom/disorder

43

35.2%

Knowledge of
symptom/difficulty

32

26.2%

Long/cumulative personal
history of experience with a
symptom/disorder

30

24.6%

Recent exposure to others
with a symptom/disorder

19

15.6%

6

4.9%

Long/cumulative exposure to
others with a
symptom/disorder

Note: Participants (N=246) were asked to select all reasons for
symptom selection; therefore, the percent column designates the
percentage of participants who endorsed that selection and does not
add up to 100%.

Generally, those who endorsed malingering symptoms of an external
nature (medical or physical disability), did so because it was easier to hide
the symptoms or to fake them. In contrast, those who chose to malinger
symptoms of a more internal nature (cognitive, memory, and psychological
impairment) did so when they had learned how to display those symptoms
(exposure to symptoms or general knowledge of the symptom presentation).
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Of the participants who endorsed malingering a medical or physical
disability symptom 54.1% (n=66) endorsed they choose this symptom due
to ease to hide their symptom, and 52.5% (n=64) due to an ease to fake.
Participants who endorsed malingering a memory impairment chose this
symptom most commonly due to recent exposure to others with that
symptom/disorder 2.5% (n=3) and due to an ease of hiding, 2.5% (n=3). Of
the participants who endorsed malingering a psychological impairment,
endorsed choosing this symptom due to recent personal experience with that
symptom, 7.4% (n=9). All other responses did not have a most common
reason for symptom choice due to few amounts of participants endorsing
these symptoms. See Table 8 for the complete results.

66

36.9%
(f=45)

Severity
Justified
Excuse

7.4%
(f=9)

32%
(f=39)

Recent
Personal
Experience

5.7%
(f=7)

21.3%
(f=26)

Long
Personal
Experience

6.6%
(f=8)

23%
(f=28)

Knowledge
of
Symptom

3.3%
(f=4)

Recent
Exposure
to other
symptoms
14.8%
(f=18)

2.5%
(f=3)

Long
Exposure
to other
symptoms
4.1%
(f=5)

2.5%
(f=3)
0%
(f=0)

1.6%
(f=2)

<1%
(f=1)

<1%
(f=1)

1.6%
(f=2)

0%
(f=0)

0%
(f=0)

<1%
(f=1)

0%
(f=0)

0%
(f=0)

0%
(f=0)

0%
(f=0)

<1%
(f=1)

1.6%
(f=2)

0%
(f=0)

<1%
(f=1)

2.5%
(f=3)

<1%
(f=1)

0%
(f=0)

0%
(f=0)

Ease
to
Fake

Ease
to
Hide

6.6%
(f=8)

Table 8
Frequencies and Percentages of Malingered Symptom Chosen Based on Reasoning for that Choice

Medical/Physical
Disability

54.1% 52.5%
(f=66) (f=64
)
4.1%
(f=5)

Memory
Impairment
<1%
(f=1)

<1%
(f=1)

4.9%
(f=6)

Cognitive
Impairment
<1%
(f=1)

Mental Health
Impairment

Brain Injury

Note: Percentages endorsed above are indicative of the percentage of the sample (N=246) that endorsed that
combination of secondary gain and symptom choice. This denotes the symptoms commonly displayed depending
on the participant's motivation.
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Who Would Malinger if Arrested
In the hypothetical scenario which involved the participant being
arrested due to an accident, only a small percentage of participants said they
would malinger, and they were predominantly Caucasian women. Only
8.5% said they would malinger (n=21), while 91.5% said they would not
(n=225). Of the 21 participants who endorsed hypothetically malingering,
28.6% (n=6) were men and 71.4% (n=15) were women. In terms of race,
81% (n=17) were Caucasian, 4.8% (n=1) were Hispanic, 4.8%(n=1) were
American Indian or Alaskan Native, 4.8% (n=1) were African American
and 4.8% (n=1) were classified as Other. The ages did not significantly
differ between those who endorsed hypothetically malingering (M=36.33,
SD=12.82) and those who did not (M=39.63, SD=14.68) (t(241) =-9.92,
p=0.285). Of those who said they would malinger, the top three most
common occupations were medical professionals (19%), full-time students
(14%), and business professionals (9.5%). Of those who said they would
not malinger, the top three most common occupations were education
professionals (13%), mental healthcare professionals (12%), and full-time
students (12%).
How They Would Malinger
Symptom Selection. Participants were asked to report what symptom
they would fake, if they must, to avoid criminal penalty. Based on the
symptom reported, responses were placed into overarching categories, and
major mental health symptoms were most commonly endorsed. When
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participants selected their own category, they more commonly identified
their symptoms as major physical or medical symptoms although symptoms
were more consistent with major mental health symptoms based on
researcher identified categories. Frequencies for these symptoms and
corresponding categories assigned by researchers or participants are
represented in Table 9. Responses were missing from 7.3% (f=18) of
participants on this question (see Table 9).

Table 9
Comparison of Symptom Category by Researcher Versus Participant
Choice
Symptom
Researcher Researcher Participant Participant
categorized categorized categorized categorized
frequency
percentage
frequency percentage
Major mental
65
26.4%
66
26.8%
health symptom
Major physical
57
23.2%
73
29.7%
or medical
difficulty
Memory
27
11.0%
59
24.0%
impairments
Brain injury or
22
8.9%
22
8.9%
neurocognitive
impairment
Intellectual
10
4.1%
6
2.4%
disability
Developmental
0
0%
2
.8%
Note: These percentages are based on n=181 participants who reported
a symptom they would fake in a hypothetical scenario.

Participants were asked why they would choose that symptom or
disorder to malinger in the hypothetical scenario. Compared to participants’
reasoning for symptom choice in their past based on the ease to hide and
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fake, participants were more likely to use their knowledge of symptom
presentation when needing to hypothetically malinger for a high stakes
situation. Knowledge of the symptom or difficulty was the most common
reason selected (28.9%; f=71). Other reasons are indicated in Table 10.

Table 10
Reason for Hypothetical Symptom Choice
Reason
Frequency

Percent

Easy to hide

40

16.3%

Easy to fake

63

25.6%

Severity of symptom justifies
39
15.9%
excuse
Recent personal experience
29
11.8%
with a symptom/disorder
Knowledge of
71
28.9%
symptom/difficulty
Long/cumulative personal
35
14.2%
history of experience with a
symptom/disorder
Recent exposure to others
14
5.7%
with a symptom/disorder
Long/cumulative exposure to
16
6.5%
others with a
symptom/disorder
Note: Participants (N=246) were asked to select all reasons for
symptom selection; therefore, the percent column designates the
percentage of participants who endorsed that selection and does not
add up to 100%.

Hypothetical and Self-Reported Malingering. Of the 49.6% of
participants (n=122) who endorsed malingering in their adult life, 9% also
endorsed that they would malinger given a hypothetical criminal scenario in
order to be released from conviction. Of the 8.5% of participants (n=21)
70

who endorsed they would malinger given a hypothetical criminal scenario,
52.4% indicated they had malingered in their adult life. No significant
relationship was found between those who had a history of malingering and
those who would hypothetically malinger in a high stakes scenario that
involved a severe outcome of a criminal conviction, (X 2 (1, N=246)= .07,
p=.79). Even those participants who reported faking in the past (49.6%)
indicated they would not malinger given a high stakes criminal scenario to
alleviate their guilt (see Figure 4).

Figure 4. Comparison: History of Malingering Versus Hypothetical
Malingering
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Symptom Selection Effectiveness. Participants were asked to
consider what type of symptom or disability would be most effective in
avoiding criminal conviction. Of the entire sample, 37.8% (f=93) believed a
brain injury or neurocognitive difficulty would be most effective, 26.8%
(f=66) believed a major mental health problem that could result in
hospitalization due to severity, 12.6% (f=31) believed a memory
impairment, 12.2% (f=30) believed intellectual disability, 7.7% (f=19) and
2.8% (f=7) believed a developmental or learning disability, respectively,
would be most effective in avoiding criminal conviction. A significant
relationship was found between the symptom category the participants
chose to fake in the hypothetical scenario and the symptom category they
believed to be most effective in alleviating guilt in a criminal conviction, (X
2 (25, N=246)= 66.49, p<.01). Of participants who chose a major physical
or medical symptom to hypothetically fake, 43.9% reported a brain injury or
neurocognitive disorder would be most likely to alleviate guilt. Of
participants who chose intellectual disability to hypothetically fake, 50%
reported a brain injury or neurocognitive disorder would be most effective
in alleviating guilt in a criminal conviction and 30% believed a major
mental health symptom would be most effective. Of participants that chose
memory impairment to hypothetically fake, 40.7% believed a brain injury
or neurocognitive disorder would be most effective in alleviating guilt in a
criminal conviction. Of participants that chose a mental health symptom to
hypothetically fake, 4.6% believed a developmental and/or learning
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disability would be most effective in alleviating guilt in a criminal
conviction, and 21.5% believed an intellectual disability would be most
effective.
Effective Symptoms by Hypothetical Decision. Regardless of
malingering status, participants believed that brain injury or neurocognitive
difficulties would be most effective in alleviating guilt in a criminal case,
followed by a major mental health disorder severe enough to require
hospitalization. Of the 21 who stated they would malinger to avoid
prosecution, 44.3% (f=54) believed brain injury or neurocognitive
difficulties would be the symptom or disorder most effective in alleviating
guilt. Participants endorsed that a major mental health problem that could
result in hospitalization due to severity of symptoms (25.4% f=31) would be
most effective, 12.3% (f=15) believed intellectual disability, 10.7% (f=13)
believed memory impairment, 4.9% (f=6) believed major physical or
medical difficulty and 2.5% (f=3) believed developmental and/or learning
disability experienced as an adult would be most effective to alleviate guilt
in a criminal conviction. Of the 225 participants who did not agree to
malinger in that scenario, 31.5% (f= 39) believed brain injury or
neurocognitive difficulties would be the symptom or disorder most effective
in alleviating guilt, 28.2 % (f= 35) believed a major mental health problem
that could result in hospitalization due to severity of symptoms would be
most effective, 14.5% (f= 18) believed memory impairment, 12.1% (f= 15)
believed intellectual disability, 10.5% (f= 13) believed major physical or
73

medical difficulty, and 3.2% (f= 4) believed developmental and/or learning
disability experienced as an adult would be most effective in alleviating
guilt of a criminal conviction.
Discussion
Who Self-Reports Malingering
In this study, 50% of the community sample participants selfreported malingering, and did so an average of 11 times as an adult. The
rates of self-reported malingering in our largely non-forensic sample are
higher than those reported by forensic samples composed of pre-trial
defendants up to post-trial inmates at a correctional facility which ranged
from 8 to 21 percent of those caught by forensic evaluators (Cornell &
Hawk, 1989; Rogers, Salekin, Sewell, Goldstein, & Leonard, 1998; Rogers,
Seman, & Clark, 1986, Rogers, Sewell, & Goldsteing, 1994). Additionally,
the number of times malingered was significantly correlated to those with
an arrest history. These results suggest that the prevalence of actual
malingering in forensic settings may be substantially higher than rates that
are detected across settings.
Contrary to our hypotheses, there were significant gender
differences in malingering outcomes in this community sample. While the
literature suggests that malingerers are often men, (3% male vs. 1% female;
Raine, 2009), the study results suggest the opposite, in that women selfreported malingering more (89%) and at a higher rate than men (average of
12 times). Additionally, in a hypothetical malingering scenario, women
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were a large proportion (71%) of those who endorsed malingering. While
this may reflect the greater proportion of females who completed the
survey, findings also provide an examination of female malingering
behaviors, an aspect that has been missing from malingering research in
general. It is also possible that women may be more inclined to endorse
their malingering behaviors that may contribute to the observed gender
differences.
In previous research that identified age factors in malingering
behaviors, malingerers who feigned psychological impairment were
significantly younger than non-malingerers (“Malingering and Factitious
Disorders,” 2013). Although we hypothesized that younger participants
would endorse higher rates of malingering, there were no significant age
differences in participants’ self-reported malingering. This suggests that
across all age ranges, individuals may be willing to admit their malingering
behaviors similarly. Similarly, no significant differences in malingering
rates were found for race. However, the sample was largely Caucasian and
limited in racial diversity which limits the generalizability of the study
results.
Of note is that a significant relationship was found between the
number of times participants reported malingering and the number of prior
arrests. Of those who endorsed a history of malingering, 50% also endorsed
a history of being arrested. This association suggests that those who break
the law may be more willing to, and potentially more capable of, deceiving
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others with their symptom presentation. Additionally, although Rogers’
(2008) adaptational model is the most widely accepted in regard to
motivation to malinger, the association between number of arrests and
malingering may provide a least some support for the criminological model,
(people with a history of antisocial personality disorder are susceptible to
malingering when faced with a forensic evaluation).
How Do People Malinger
When participants were asked what most motivated their feigning
behaviors, avoiding work and social activities were identified as the
secondary gain that occurred most frequently (when participants were asked
to select all areas of secondary gain that related to their feigning behaviors)
and was most commonly (when participants were asked to select one
secondary gain option that motivated them most often) endorsed as well.
This finding suggests that participants malinger more in low stakes
scenarios when their symptoms are unlikely to be assessed for genuineness
and legitimacy. Additionally, consequences of such behaviors are unlikely
and would be mild if revealed. Therefore, decisions about feigning
symptoms may depend on the level of risk associated with a given situation.
As hypothesized, medical and physical disabilities were most
frequently malingered by participants at rates significantly and dramatically
higher than all other types of symptoms. This result is not surprising given
the nature of secondary gain most commonly utilized (avoiding work
obligations). It is unlikely and unnecessary to feign a major impairment,
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such as a brain injury or cognitive impairment, for the purpose of time off
from work, just as it is not likely that participants would feign psychological
impairment in return for a day off from work. Due to the current societal
perception of mental health difficulties, even if an individual experienced
true psychological distress, potential judgment or bias from others may
prevent him/her from divulging this information and feigning this type of
symptom. The symptom fits the gain in this case.
An interesting outcome of symptom choice was the comparison of
symptom and secondary gain. As noted, medical and physical impairments
were most commonly endorsed symptoms to be feigned as was the
secondary gain of avoid work or occupational responsibilities. In a
comparison of the relationship between these two variables, participants
most commonly endorsed feigning a medical or physical symptom at a
higher rate than any other type of symptoms, for the majority of secondary
gain categories. However, when they were trying to incur monetary gain,
participants malingered psychological impairment more often. The
secondary gain of incurring monetary gain could likely be associated with
cases such of disability or workers compensation. Although Feuerstein and
colleagues (2005) suggested that physical impairment is more often
malingered in relationship to financial claims for disability benefits or
workers compensation claims, this was based on a comparison to forensic
cases, in which psychological impairment was more common due to fitting
the desired outcome of avoiding prison. In general, 35% of disability
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recipients qualify for psychological impairment (NAMI, 2013). As such, it
is likely that participants may choose to feign psychological impairment in
hope for monetary gain as there would no objective manifestations of the
legitimacy of their disorder, nor a medical test that could, without a doubt,
justify its legitimacy.
When asked to select reasons for past feigned symptoms,
participants most commonly chose symptoms they were able to demonstrate
with most ease, followed by symptoms that made sense for the
situation/scenario. This result supports an adaptational model of
malingering (Rogers, 2008) in which participants not only adapt to a
situation in which they need to self-protect but also mindfully produce and
utilize symptoms that meet the qualifications to achieve their secondary
gain. In general, avoiding work and occupational obligations are low stakes
scenarios and require little planning and symptom production to
successfully achieve a goal. Therefore, it is likely that participants would
utilize easy to hide and easy to fake symptoms to meet their desired
outcome as they have a high chance of success whether or not they
skillfully produce their symptom. Participants may simply choose
symptoms that require little effort to feign. For example, if a person needed
to miss work, they could call in sick stating they have a cold. A cold is easy
to produce and hide its legitimacy which is likely why it is most commonly
identified as the reason for symptom choice; however, the reason a cold is
easy to hide and fake is because the commonality of such illnesses and
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participants likely having immense experience with a cold. Although not as
highly endorsed, there is likely a component of personal experience (both of
frequency and recency) in the ability to easily hide and fake symptoms most
commonly endorsed. Additionally, patterns suggested that those who
endorsed exterior malingering symptoms (medical or physical disability),
did so because those symptoms may be perceived as easier to fake and hide.
On the other hand, those who endorsed internal malingering symptoms
(cognitive, memory, and psychological impairment) did so when they had
prior exposure to those symptoms and learned how to display them.
How Would They Malinger
A primary objective of this study was to identify outcomes of
malingering symptoms in a hypothetical criminal scenario including: the
rate of people who would attempt to malinger, the symptom believed most
likely to avoid criminal responsibility, the symptom most commonly chosen
to malinger, and reasons for symptom choice. It was hypothesized that due
to the desire to present one’s self in a positive light, there would be a low
proportion (less than 20%) of participants who would self-report
hypothetical malingering in a criminal situation. This hypothesis was
supported, as only 8.5% of participants stated they would fake an illness in
order to attempt to alleviate guilt. Although rates of malingering in forensic
scenarios are quite variable, Rogers, Seman, and Clark (1986) identified
21% of criminal defendants, evaluated for criminal responsibility (which
would mirror the evaluation that would occur for this individual in the
79

hypothetical vignette) as malingering. It is not surprising that self-reported
malingering rates in a community sample would be lower than those of
verified malingering in forensic samples and that the magnitude of the
difference may be smaller in a more representative sample with varying
criminal histories.
The adaptational model theory proposed by Rogers (2008)
suggested people would choose symptoms to malinger based on adapting to
an adverse situation and avoiding conviction by faking illness. This study
demonstrated that when participants were placed in a hypothetical highstake scenario, they would utilize their knowledge of symptoms to convince
others of their lack of guilt compared to past incidents of malingering when
they chose symptoms based on convenience and ease. Furthermore,
although medical symptoms were commonly malingered on past occasions
of faked behaviors, participants endorsed utilizing more brain and
psychological impairments to alleviate guilt, suggesting they adapt their
behavior and decision-making style to match situations with difficult
outcomes.
Public perception of what would alleviate guilt (not guilty by reason
of insanity) or delay court proceedings (competency to stand trial) in a
criminal conviction is largely unknown. However, understanding such
information is beneficial to those professional psychologists who attempt to
identify the legitimacy of symptoms. If it is of public perception that
memory impairment is most likely to alleviate guilt in a criminal case, rates
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of malingering memory impairment are likely to be higher. Psychologists
should have that information to be adept at assessing for validity of
symptoms. As such, participants were asked what class of symptoms they
would believe to be most effective in alleviating guilt in a criminal case.
Irrespective of malingering status, participants believed that brain injury or
neurocognitive difficulties would be most effective in alleviating guilt in a
criminal case, followed by a major mental health disorder severe enough to
require hospitalization. Although standards for adjudication of not guilty by
reason of insanity (NGRI) vary by state and jurisdiction, it is a widely
accepted standard asserted by trained forensic examiners that there must be
a “severe” impairment of a cognitive nature that has a physiological and/or
psychological component, not those of a volitional or personality-based
behavior (Insanity defense, 2000). Thus, these results suggest that
participants are keen on symptoms that rise to the standard of a severe
impairment (in this case forms of brain impairment) as they predominately
endorsed symptoms that would be commonly related to success in
alleviating guilt under the NGRI plea. These findings provide additional
evidence that malingerers know how best to adapt to a scenario in an
attempt to successfully malinger.
Although no significant relationship was found between participants'
past malingering behaviors and their hypothetical response to a criminal
scenario, an examination of the trends in the findings yields an interesting
perspective on how individuals perceive their own behavior. Of the
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participants who endorsed a history of malingering, half of those believed
they would not malinger given a high stakes scenario to alleviate their guilt,
despite their past behavior. This may be due to a desire of individuals to
identify themselves as moral or reflect an inability to envision themselves in
situations with much to lose.
As previously discussed, Rogers proposed three models that are the
underlying motivation to malingering behaviors; criminological,
pathogenic, and adaptational. The adaptational model, which suggests
people would malinger due to an adaptive inclination in an adverse
situation, has gained the most support throughout the malingering literature.
As such it was hypothesized that this literature would again support this
adaptational model. This study demonstrated that when participants were
placed in a hypothetical high-stake scenario, they would utilize their
knowledge of symptoms to convince others of their lack of guilt, compared
to past incidents of malingering when they chose symptoms based on
convenience and ease (i.e. tailoring symptoms to the scenario or situation).
Additionally, participants suggested that they would feign symptoms of a
higher severity (brain injury and psychological impairment), and those more
likely to be successful in an attempt to alleviate criminal guilt. In general,
hypothetical malingering responses in this study supported our prediction of
the adaptational model. Although the adaptational model is most strongly
supported by our findings, the strong correlation between past, selfreported, malingering and past arrests would suggest partial support for the
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criminological model in which those with antisocial tendencies (particularly
those with criminal behavior) are more likely to malinger.
Limitations and Future Areas of Research
This study is unique in its attempt to examine malingering strategies
based on self-report versus simulated studies or evaluator/provider
identification of malingering behaviors, conducted in past research. In
addition, this study builds on preliminary work and investigates how
individuals choose the symptoms they malinger. However, this study is not
without its limitations. First, as self-reporting malingering behaviors and
strategies may provide direct information about malingering practices, it
may be subject to bias and may depend on the participant’s recollection of
earlier experiences that cannot be objectively confirmed. Second, the
sample size for this study is relatively small which limits its generalizability
to the greater population. Furthermore, the sample size of men was quite
small. As rates of the male prevalence in malingering research are rather
prominent, given their involvement in the criminal justice system, a larger
sample of male participants could have allowed for more meaningful
comparisons between genders in addition to determining if the frequency of
malingering among women was indeed significantly higher. Third, specific
information on the arrest history of participants was not collected. If arrest
records involved substance induced charges, as was displayed in the
vignette, or if the participants had children and had an adverse reaction to
the child victim scenario, experiences such as these could have prompted an
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unusual response and affected rates of malingering. Lastly, as this study is
the first of its kind, it evaluates symptomatology on a global categorical
level and does not provide information about the specific symptoms or
impairments most commonly feigned. For example, participants are asked
whether they have faked a symptom in an area of medical disability or
psychological impairment (etc.) instead of what specific symptoms they
faked. Additionally, other scenarios could be offered to identify selfreported strategies in both civil charges, correctional settings and medical
and mental health treatment settings. It is likely that an individual’s
experience and familiarity with these varied settings may also impact a
person’s ability to malinger without being detected.
In future research studies of self-reported malingering, a variety of
specific samples could be surveyed to identify prevalence rates for specific
populations in which malingering prominently occurs. Of note, genuine
psychiatric patients would be of particular interest, as well as medical
patients, and those in correctional facilities to compare prevalence rates and
use of malingering strategies. With these samples we could be better
equipped to answer whether people who have more experience with
symptoms (genuine psychiatric and medical) fake more often because of
their skill in displaying symptoms. Additional methodology comparing selfreport to malingering assessment outcomes should be considered to
compare rates of detection versus self-report. As research on malingering
strategies and behaviors continue to develop, it is crucial for mental health
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professionals to remain informed and utilize emerging research in the
assessment and identification of malingering behaviors.
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